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The Nonprofit Sector’s Uncertain Future
in a Post-TCJA America
The tax deduction for charitable contributions has existed in the
Internal Revenue Code in some form since the early 1900s. While the
charitable deduction has been preserved in the U.S. tax code for more than
100 years, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of December 2017 threatens
charities by removing the tax incentive to donate to charity from all but
the wealthiest taxpayers.
Both charities and nonprofits play a vital role in the U.S. economy by
providing some goods and services more efficiently than the public or
private sectors. In this Note I explore the role of nonprofits in the U.S.
economy and how the federal government has used tax incentives to
encourage taxpayers to donate to charities. I describe how new changes in
TCJA, including doubling the standard deduction, increasing the estate
tax exemption, capping the state and local tax deduction, and lowering the
income tax rates, remove the tax incentives for most individual taxpayers
to donate to charity. I then propose solutions to the problems that TCJA
created for charities. I submit that a carefully constructed universal
charitable deduction could be a fiscally efficient subsidy. TCJA created an
uncertain future for the nonprofit sector. Implementing the proposals in
this Note could help preserve the future of the nonprofit sector in the
United States by making the tax incentive to give to charity available to
all taxpayers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I’m a believer that philanthropy is not a financial decision; you’ve got
the gene to give—it feels good, literally it’s the love of humans. I get that.
But if it wasn’t at least a little tied to a financial decision, then why are
all of our charitable funds established at the end of the year?1

The preceding quote introduces an interesting concept: is
donating to charity motivated by a universal human desire to assist
others, or is it a financial decision? It is most likely some mixture of
the two, but this is only one of many issues that charities must
grapple with as they try to predict the effects of 2017’s Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (TCJA), a tax bill that may reduce donations to charities by
up to $24 billion this year.2 As a result of TCJA, millions of taxpayers will no longer have an incentive to use the charitable deduction, which reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income by the amount
1. Bernie Story, president of the Lehigh Valley Community Foundation, a group that
provides charitable funds in Pennsylvania, quoted in Carolyn Y. Johnson, The GOP Plan to
Simplify Taxes Could Put Charitable Giving at Risk, WASH. POST: W ONKBLOG (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/11/the-gop-plan-to-simpli
fy-taxes-could-put-charitable-giving-at-risk/?utm_term=.7ea7f6218425.
2. Bryan McQueeney, Opinion, The GOP Tax Reform Will Devastate Charitable Giving,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mc
queeney-charitable-giving-under-new-tax-law-20171227-story.html.
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they donate to charity.3 This leaves U.S. charities in a vulnerable
position, especially since many of them already operate on tight
budgets. The number of taxpayers who can take advantage of this
deduction is expected to drop from 37 million to around 16 million
this year, as estimated in one study by the Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center.4 If donating to charity is indeed (at least in part) a
financial decision, as the introductory quote suggests, one can
expect donations to charities to decrease for tax year 2018.
This Note provides an overview of how TCJA may discourage
taxpayers from donating to charities until TCJA sunsets in 2025. I
will begin in Part II by investigating the important role that the
nonprofit sector, which includes charities, plays in the U.S.
economy. In Part III, I will explore how a past tax reform affected
charitable giving in the United States. In Part IV, I will summarize
key changes to the tax code, as a result of TCJA, that may decrease
charitable donations, including the increase in the standard
deduction, the increase in the estate tax exemption, and the $10,000
state and local tax deduction cap. To finish, I will propose changes
to the current tax law that could prevent the potential problems
associated with TCJA. The first proposal is to extend a charitable
deduction to nonitemizers. The second is to extend the ability to
deduct charitable donations through April 15 to encourage donating closer to the end of the tax season. My third suggestion is to
eliminate the phaseout for the charitable deduction. TCJA removes
the incentive to donate to charity from the tax code for all but the
wealthy who can continue to take the charitable deduction. Implementing any of these proposals could help preserve the incentive
in the tax code to donate to charity for everyone, instead of just the
wealthy, as TCJA does now.

3. Under § 67(b)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer is authorized to take an
itemized deduction, which reduces the taxpayer’s overall taxable income, for “deductions
under section 170 (relating to charitable, etc., contributions and gifts).” 26 U.S.C § 67(b)
(2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018).
4. Fred Stokeld, Fewer Taxpayers Expected to Claim Charitable Deduction, TAX NOTES
(Jan. 29, 2018).
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II. CHARITIES AND THEIR ROLE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
While one of the purposes of TCJA was to simplify taxes by
reducing the number of itemizers, it created complications and
uncertainty for charities. TCJA will likely end itemization for most
Americans, who will no longer have to worry about keeping track
of charitable donations or home mortgage interest,5 two popular
itemized deductions. While this may be convenient for taxpayers,
charities that rely heavily on donations to perform their role may
be in danger of losing funding if fewer people give to charity this
year and coming years in response to TCJA. This Part explains the
important role of the charitable or nonprofit sector in the U.S.
economy, demonstrates that the U.S. government recognizes this
role and supports the charitable sector through tax incentives, and
shows that TCJA has charities worried about the implications of
reducing the availability of the charitable deduction. For clarification, the word charity in this Note does not refer simply to generosity to the poor. For purposes of this Note, I will be using the terms
charity and nonprofit interchangeably, both referring to any organization to which taxpayers can make deductible donations under
§ 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.6
A. Role of Charities in the U.S. Economy
The charitable sector is a vital part of the U.S. economy and
plays a role that supports the public sector in promoting the general
good and solving social problems.7 The nonprofit sector is made
up of hospitals, religious groups, associations, schools, research
universities, nongovernmental organizations, and some international relief agencies.8 In the last year, members of the nonprofit
sector have provided relief to U.S. citizens in the face of multiple
disasters. They stepped up to help people who lost their homes in

5. Johnson, supra note 1.
6. 26 U.S.C. § 170.
7. C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving:

Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX
POL’Y 399, 401–02 (1995).
8. Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Fundamental Tax
Reform on Nonprofit Organizations, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 211,
211 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
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California’s wildfires and in the hurricanes and floods that devastated Puerto Rico and the Gulf Coast.9 They responded to mass
shootings in Texas, Florida, and Las Vegas.10 They worked to meet
the needs of hungry children, abused women, the disabled, and
the homeless.11
B. The Government’s Interest in Subsidizing the Charitable Sector
The United States relies on nonprofits significantly more than
other countries and provides nonprofits with favorable tax
treatment for carrying out important social functions.12 Congress
has passed laws to ensure that organizations are properly classified
as tax exempt, but it provides incentives to nonprofits and their
donors because they play an important role in the U.S. economy.
The nonprofit sector, in turn, has molded itself to conform to the
tax code in order to continue to enjoy these tax incentives.13 The
government’s interest in subsidizing nonprofits stems from the fact
that nonprofits often fill gaps the government cannot fill. For
instance, many churches provide public goods that the government
would otherwise have to pay for, including counseling, youth
programs, and aid to the poor. At a time when discretionary government services are growing scarcer, and the federal government
contemplates more budget cuts, the nonprofit sector’s role in filling
holes in social safety nets has become even more important.14
Nonprofits not only provide a safety net for the unfortunate, they
provide many other public goods, thereby relieving government of
the cost of doing so.
The charitable deduction decreases the amount of revenue the
government can raise because it reduces the amount of an individual’s or household’s money the government can tax. Though the
federal government loses money by preserving the charitable
deduction, this loss is offset by a greater increase in charitable
donations, arguably making the deduction a fiscally efficient

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

McQueeney, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8.
Id.
Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8, at 217.
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subsidy.15 Congress clearly has a vested interest in preserving the
charitable deduction. Some studies have found that eliminating the
deduction altogether could reduce individual charitable donations
by amounts as high as 35%, which would cripple charitable organizations and, consequently, put more pressure on the public sector.16
C. Leaders of Charitable Organizations Respond to TCJA
Some charities rely more heavily on deductible donations than
others, so it is difficult to make general statements about how
changes to the tax code will affect charities.17 However, it is clear
that TCJA will decrease the number of taxpayers who itemize. In
2017, itemizers gave approximately $239 billion in charitable donations while nonitemizers contributed an estimated $53 billion.18
According to a study at Indiana University, more than 80% of
itemizers made charitable donations in 2017, compared to only 44%
of nonitemizers.19 Last year 25 million homes itemized, and some
studies estimate that number dropping to 7 million for the 2018 tax
year.20 Charities now face an uncertain future because it is difficult
to predict how many taxpayers will continue to itemize and how
many new nonitemizers will continue to donate without the tax
incentives to do so. Those who will itemize for the 2018 tax year
will overwhelmingly be wealthier households.21 Many of the
households that will no longer be able to take advantage of the
charitable deduction are middle-class households, meaning charities that depend on donations from middle-class donors will likely
be those most affected by TCJA.22
The United Way is a charity that depends on smaller donations
from middle-class families. It receives an average of 7.2 million
donations every year, averaging around $154 per donation.23
15. Ernest M. Zampelli & Steven T. Yen, The Impact of Tax Price Changes on Charitable
Contributions to the Needy, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 113, 121 (2017).
16. Id. at 113.
17. Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8, at 213.
18. JOSEPH ROSENBERG ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NEW DEBATE OVER A CHARITABLE DEDUCTION FOR NONITEMIZERS 1, 5 (Oct. 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default
/files/publication/135446/the-new-ebate-over-a-charitable-deduction-for-nonitemizers.pdf.
19. Johnson, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
23. Johnson, supra note 1.
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Steven Taylor, senior vice president at United Way Worldwide,
discussed the difficulties facing charities as a result of TCJA:
We have spent an enormous amount of time up on the Hill,
and we get back the talking point, “Oh, don’t worry—we preserve
the charitable deduction.” That makes it seems [sic] like many
lawmakers don’t understand, themselves, what the ramifications
of this legislation are . . . . A lot of charities are coming to grips
with the fact that there may come a point where individual
charities would have to start having to come out in actual
opposition to the tax reform bill—and no charities want to be put
in that position.24

Some charities are legitimately concerned about the implications of TCJA. One may wonder if these concerns are warranted or
if Americans are more altruistic when it comes to donating to
charity. By looking at a previous tax reform that changed incentives
for taxpayers to give to charity, one can see that tax incentives
motivate charitable giving in the United States and that diminishing such incentives will likely decrease charitable giving.
III. HOW THE 1981 TAX REFORM AFFECTED
CHARITABLE DONATIONS
Deciding to what extent tax incentives motivate charitable
giving in the United States would be an extremely difficult task, but
past tax reforms provide insight into the effect changes to the tax
code have on taxpayer behavior with respect to charitable donations. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) has attracted
a lot of attention from scholars because it slowly introduced a
charitable deduction for nonitemizers between 1982 and 1986.25 The
data about this nonitemizer deduction as it existed in the 1980s
allows us to compare the responsiveness of nonitemizer giving to
tax incentives and, therefore, determine whether charitable giving
is significantly influenced by tax incentives.

24. Id.
25. Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax

Incentives? New Evidence, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 195, 195–96 (1999).
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A. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
ERTA slowly phased in a charitable deduction for nonitemizers.
During the first two years, nonitemizers could only deduct 25 cents
per dollar given to charity for the first $100 of giving, with a maximum deduction of $25.26 In 1984, the ceiling on deductible giving
increased to $300, so nonitemizers could receive a charitable deduction of up to $75.27 In 1985, the ceiling was removed, and nonitemizers were allowed to deduct half of the amount they gave to charity
with no limitation on the total amount of giving.28 By 1986, nonitemizer giving was completely deductible and identical to the
charitable deduction for itemizers. The effect of the ERTA experiment on nonitemizer giving is summarized in the following table.29
Table 1

From this data, it is clear that giving among nonitemizers
increased when contribution limits were removed in 1985 and
again in 1986. The average dollar amount claimed per nonitemizer
increased from $51 to $186 between 1984 and 1985. This number
increased again to $474 in 1986, the last year that the charitable
deduction was available to nonitemizers.30 Between 1982 and 1986,
taxpayers donated an estimated $31.16 billion to charities.31
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Total of $31.16 billion found by multiplying the dollars claimed each year by
the appropriate multiple. From 1982 through 1984, the dollars claimed in billions multiplied
by four represents the total amount given to charity, as only 25 cents per dollar could be
claimed by the taxpayer. In 1985, the dollars claimed must be multiplied by two to find the
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B. ERTA Aftermath
The preceding data on ERTA supports the claim that charitable
giving by nonitemizers is responsive to tax incentives. With respect
to charities, ERTA’s purpose was to introduce a tax deduction for
charitable giving to nonitemizers who previously did not have that
incentive. The nonitemizer deduction in the bill was enacted to
“stimulate giving by all individual taxpayers, including those who
do not benefit from itemizing.”32 In that respect, ERTA succeeded
and was able to increase charitable giving in the United States
during the short period that it was available.
Another important takeaway from ERTA is that the degree of
responsiveness to tax incentives with respect to donations for
nonitemizers is smaller than it is for itemizers.33 Nonitemizers
generally are less responsive to changes in the price of giving since
they have less disposable income than itemizers. But ERTA
reduced the after-tax price of charitable contributions for nonitemizers and succeeded in stimulating charitable giving by this tax
group.34 Understanding how nonitemizers respond to incentives in
the tax code could assist policymakers in designing charitable
contribution deductions that could apply to nonitemizers if the
provision were to be revived.35 Nonitemizers are an important
group to consider when studying whether a universal charitable
deduction would be effective, since taxpayers who itemize have
more of an incentive to give to charity and are more responsive to
changes in the price of giving.36
If ERTA was so valuable and it stimulated charitable giving,
even among nonitemizers, why did Congress let it expire in 1986?
It’s important to understand that Congress set a 1986 expiration
date when ERTA was enacted in 1981 so it could assess ERTA’s
effectiveness and determine whether the charitable deduction for

total amount donated to charity. The amount claimed in 1986 represents the total amount
given to charity, as charitable donations were fully deductible by that year.
32. Amy E. Dunbar & John Phillips, The Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions:
The Case of Nonitemizing Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N, 1997 Supp., 1, 2 (citation omitted).
33. Duquette, supra note 25, at 203.
34. Id. at 204.
35. Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 1.
36. Id. at 2.
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nonitemizers was worth keeping.37 In 1984, the Treasury released a
report concluding that the charitable deduction for nonitemizers
should not be extended. In the report, the Treasury reasoned that
there was unnecessary complexity in enforcing ERTA and that it
stimulated little additional giving.38 It was also unnecessarily
complex for itemizing taxpayers, who had to calculate their taxes
twice to determine which deduction would decrease their tax bill
the most: once with the traditional charitable deduction and once
taking the standard deduction and the new charitable deduction
for nonitemizers.39 Another reason for ERTA’s ineffectiveness
according to the Treasury was that nonitemizers gave small donations that were not made in response to tax incentives. These
donations probably would have been made by nonitemizers even
in the absence of ERTA.40 One proposal in 1986 to keep the nonitemizer deduction with a $100 floor was rejected without explanation, and Congress let ERTA expire in 1987.41 This is puzzling, as
it was clear that lifting the limitation on nonitemizer deductions in
1986 prompted more taxpayers to give and at higher rates than ever
before. Many scholars believe that Congress was unwise to allow
the expiration of this effective tax subsidy when it did not preserve
the charitable deduction for nonitemizers in ERTA.42 At the very
least, ERTA demonstrates that all taxpayers, not just the wealthy
who currently enjoy the benefits of the deduction for charitable
contributions, respond in some degree to tax incentives to give
to charity.
IV. HOW TCJA CHANGED TAX INCENTIVES TO DONATE
It is clear from the previous Part that donating to charity in the
United States is, in part, driven by tax incentives. In December of
2017, TCJA introduced three changes that will expire after 2025 and
will most likely reduce the total amount of charitable donations in
the United States until then. First, the standard deduction was

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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Id. at 4–5.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 7.
Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 5.
Id.
See id. at 18.
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doubled. Second, the estate tax exemption was increased to
$11.2 million. Third, the state and local tax deduction was capped
at $10,000.43 Each of these changes decreases the incentive to donate
to charity by reducing the number of people who can take the
charitable deduction, removing tax incentives to donate to charity
for some estates, and leaving taxpayers in high-tax states with less
money to donate to charity.
A. Doubling the Standard Deduction
The new provisions in TCJA will prevent many middle-class
families from taking a charitable deduction because these provisions doubled the amount of the standard deduction. A taxpayer
can choose between itemizing and taking the standard deduction.
If a taxpayer’s itemized deductions add up to more than the standard deduction, they will take the itemized deduction because it
will subtract more from their taxable income, leaving them with
less income that can be taxed. The standard deduction in 2017 for a
single taxpayer was $6350, and $12,700 for married taxpayers filing
jointly.44 For the 2018 tax year, TCJA will almost double the standard deduction. A single taxpayer in 2018 can expect a standard
deduction of $12,000, and married taxpayers filing jointly can take
a standard deduction of $24,000.45 Now, in order to itemize, a
married couple filing jointly must have total itemized deductions
of more than $24,000. This means that many taxpayers who
previously itemized will have an easier time doing their taxes
because they will not have to keep track of home mortgage interest,
state and local taxes, medical expenses, and charitable contributions. However, this will cause some middle-income couples who
previously itemized to no longer itemize, because their total
itemized deductions will no longer exceed the standard deduction.
This means they will no longer be able to deduct charitable
43. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
44. Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Announces 2017 Tax Rates, Standard Deductions, Exemption

Amounts and More, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillips
erb/2016/10/25/irs-announces-2017-tax-rates-standard-deductions-exemption-amounts
-and-more/#22c1de8c5701.
45. TAX FOUND., PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT
(Dec. 2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171220113959/TaxFoundation-SR241-TCJA
-3.pdf.
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donations from their taxable income.46 It also bears mentioning
that the standard deduction reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income
for federal tax purposes, not for state taxes. State taxes will not
be reduced as a result of the increase in the standard deduction.
Doubling the standard deduction is, therefore, bad news for
charities. TCJA will reduce the number of taxpayers who will be
able to take the charitable deduction.47 Those who will continue to
itemize are wealthy individuals and families who have itemized
deductions greater than $24,000. Taxpayers with an adjusted gross
income of at least $100,000, possibly as high as $200,000, may have
over $24,000 in itemized deductions, per Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) data.48 This is incongruent with the original purpose of the
charitable deduction and only provides a tax incentive for the
wealthy to donate to charity. Roger Colinvaux, law professor and
former legislation counsel on Congress’s nonpartisan Joint Committee on Taxation, had the following to say concerning this issue:
One of the points of the charitable deduction is to foster
altruism, to foster pluralism, to foster civic society . . . . If the
deduction ends up being for the top 5 percent of taxpayers who
are the wealthiest, I think you’re really painting a very elitist
picture of what this incentive is for. It’s only incentivizing the
charitable choices of the richest, and the pluralism of the richest,
and the civic groups chosen by the wealthiest.49

U.S. tax law should not provide incentives that solely
incentivize the wealthy to donate to charities. As the current law
stands, it does present an elitist picture of the charitable deduction’s
purpose, as Professor Colinvaux remarked.

46. McQueeney, supra note 2.
47. Zampelli & Yen, supra note 15, at 113.
48. I extracted this example from the IRS’s tax statistics on individuals for the taxable

year of 2016. See generally SOI Tax Stats–Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross
Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size
-of-adjusted-gross-income (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). Specifically, I looked to Tables 1.4 and
2.1 for the 2016 taxable year. Id.
49. Johnson, supra note 1.
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B. Increasing the Estate Tax Exemption
The estate tax encourages charitable giving when one passes
away by allowing a deduction for charitable bequests that are
greater than an exemption floor provided by the tax law and less
than the gross amount of the entire estate.50 Indeed, due to tax
incentives, some estates give more than half of their wealth to
nonprofits in order to pay less estate tax.51 Annually, estates give
an estimated $20 billion in charitable bequests.52 This is a significant
source of funding for charities and nonprofits.
TCJA increases the estate tax exemption, which will almost
certainly reduce the number and amount of charitable bequests.53
By doubling the estate tax exemption from $5.6 million to
$11.2 million, or $22.4 million for couples, TCJA will reduce the
number of estates facing an estate tax and for which an estate tax
charitable contribution can be beneficial.54 The number of taxable
estates will decrease by approximately two-thirds in 2018, leaving
only about 1700 estates that will owe federal tax and thus retain the
incentive to give to charity.55 TCJA also reduces the amount of
estate tax these 1700 estates would owe, which will shrink from
$20.4 billion to an estimated $13.6 billion.56 The heirs of a few
wealthy decedents will now receive an estimated $7 billion as a
result of TCJA.57 Not only does this reduce the number of people
who can benefit by donating to charity at death, it produces the
same problem discussed in the previous section; that is, it only
incentivizes the extremely wealthy with estates worth more than

50. See Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction:
Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX L. 331, 358 n.187 (2015).
51. David Joulfaian, On Estate Tax Repeal and Charitable Bequests, TAX NOTES 1221, 1223
(June 8, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415058.
52. Id. at 1221.
53. JON M. BAKIJA & WILLIAM G. GALE, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., EFFECTS OF
ESTATE TAX REFORM ON CHARITABLE GIVING (July 2003), https://www.urban.org/research
/publication/effects-estate-tax-reform-charitable-giving (Tax Policy Issues and Options Ser.
No. 6).
54. See TAX FOUND., supra note 45.
55. Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the
TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/only-1700-estates-would-owe-estate-tax-2018-under-tcja.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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$11.2 million to donate to charity. This exemption was $600,000 just
twenty years ago, providing the incentive to donate to charity for
many more people than TCJA does.58 Charitable donations from
estates, as a result of the estate tax, are an important income source
for charities. If the estate tax were repealed, charitable bequests
would drop anywhere between an estimated $3.6 billion and
$6 billion.59 As a result of the new law, fewer people will leave
money to nonprofits, potentially leaving some charities without an
important source of funding.60
C. Capping the State and Local Tax Deduction
and Lowering Income Tax Rates
TCJA will also cap the state and local tax (SALT) deduction at a
maximum of $10,000.61 “The SALT deduction [in some form] has
been part of every version of the [tax code in U.S. history].”62 The
SALT deduction is an oft-debated provision in the tax code, but
many agree that despite its weaknesses, it is an efficient subsidy
that is worth keeping.63 It encourages states to spend more on
public services and move toward a progressive income tax,
reducing overall income inequality.64 It reduces the cost for
localities and states to raise taxes on the wealthy.65 The new TCJA
cap on the SALT deduction makes it more expensive for states
and localities to tax the wealthy.66 It will also reduce the likelihood that taxpayers will have itemized deductions in excess of
the standard deduction.
The deduction cap of $10,000 may seem high, but the average
SALT deduction in recent years was actually greater than $10,000
in twenty states.67 It isn’t unique for a taxpayer to take a SALT
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

McQueeney, supra note 2.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 1.
TAX FOUND., supra note 45.
Tracy Gordon, The Price We Pay for Capping the SALT Deduction, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/taxvox/price-we-pay-capping-salt-deduction.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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deduction of more than $10,000, so it is reasonable that this cap will
prompt some taxpayers to not itemize and thus not allow them to
take advantage of the charitable deduction. Taxpayers in high-tax
states such as Oregon, California, Pennsylvania, and New York,
who rely heavily on the state and local tax deduction to reduce their
taxable income, will be hit hardest by the new cap. Losing this
deduction, especially when coupled with the doubling of the
standard deduction, will leave itemizers in these states with less
money to give to charity.68
TCJA also lowered individual income tax rates, which reduces
the value of tax deductions, including the deduction for charitable
contributions.69 The income tax subsidy for charitable giving was
reduced by approximately one-third, or from $63 billion to an
estimated $42 billion, so the higher cost of charitable giving will
make it too expensive to give for many taxpayers whose giving was
primarily motivated by tax incentives.70 Now, the average marginal
tax benefit for giving to charity will drop from almost 21% to an
estimated 15%.71 This number will drop more significantly for lowand middle-income taxpayers; but for those in the top 1%, it will
only fall from about 30% to an estimated 29%.72 These reductions in
marginal tax benefits will even prompt a reduction in the percentage of taxpayers who itemize and earn between $86,000 and
$150,000. The percentage of taxpayers who itemize and fall in this
income range will drop from 39% to an estimated 15%.73 As it is
now, TCJA does much to reduce incentives to give to charity for
middle- and low-income earners while preserving this incentive for
the top earners in America.
In the wake of TCJA, high-tax states have rallied to propose new
solutions to the cap on the SALT deduction. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo said that limiting the deduction on state and local

68. McQueeney, supra note 2.
69. Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking the Charitable Deduction

Under the TCJA, TAX P OL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 8, 2018), http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-deduc
tion-under-tcja.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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taxes was an “act of war.”74 California Senate leader Kevin de Leon
said that the cap on the SALT deduction is a “tax scam [that]
disproportionately harms California taxpayers.”75 In response,
high-tax states are trying to find ways to offset the harm to their
taxpayers. One proposal that is gaining traction in Connecticut
would impose a new tax on partnerships, LLCs, and other passthrough businesses while giving the owners of such businesses a
tax credit to offset this amount.76 The SALT deduction cap does not
apply to businesses, and giving a credit to business owners
effectively shifts an estimated $600 million in lost SALT deductions
back to Connecticut residents.77 If the federal government adopted
this proposal, it would pay for the removal of adverse effects of
TCJA on Connecticut taxpayers. Another proposal in New York
would replace the individual state income tax with a business
payroll tax that would be fully deductible.78
In California, another high-tax state, one popular proposal is to
change state and local taxes into charitable gifts to nonprofits that
would be organized by the state and fund services such as
education.79 Both of these proposals have gained some support, but
some tax experts do not consider them feasible due to the technical
problems that would be created upon implementation.80 The
Connecticut plan also has limitations because it would protect
owners of pass-through entities without helping workers who
receive income in the form of wages and salaries.81 The proposal
would also encourage owners of S corporations, partnerships, and
other pass-through entities to move their businesses to Connecticut
to take advantage of this potential tax break.82 This proposal

74. Gordon, supra note 62.
75. Id.
76. Howard Gleckman, Could States Fix the SALT Deduction Cap by Taxing Pass-

Throughs and Giving Their Owners a Credit?, TAX P OL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/could-states-fix-salt
-deduction-cap-taxing-pass-throughs-and-giving-their-owners-credit.
77. Amy Hamilton, Connecticut Finds a SALT Workaround that Would Actually Work,
TAX NOTES (Feb. 26, 2018).
78. Gleckman, supra note 69.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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perpetuates one of the main problems with TCJA and the Internal
Revenue Code in general—disproportionate tax breaks for the
wealthy.83 Increases in the standard deduction and estate tax
exemption, along with the new cap for SALT deductions and
income tax rates imposed by TCJA, generally give taxpayers the
incentive to take the standard deduction and discourage them from
giving to charity for tax purposes.
V. POTENTIAL FIXES TO PROBLEMS INTRODUCED BY TCJA
The new tax legislation from 2018 seems to significantly diminish tax incentives to donate to charity. I will now propose changes
to TCJA that would preserve these important incentives. First, I will
propose a charitable deduction for nonitemizers, examine the
history of the charitable deduction, and explore its benefits. I will
then address possible problems such as the administrative costs
and enforcement problems associated with implementing a
charitable deduction for all taxpayers. In response to these valid
concerns, I propose that a charitable deduction with a floor could
be an efficient subsidy despite the aforementioned problems. I will
also briefly discuss other changes to TCJA that would result in
more charitable giving, including extending the deadline for
charitable deductions to April 15 and eliminating the phaseout for
charitable deductions. If properly designed, changes to TCJA could
provide efficient tax subsidies to more taxpayers who would then
give more to charity.
A. Charitable Deduction for Nonitemizers
One popular proposal to make the charitable deduction available to more taxpayers is to open up the charitable deduction to
both itemizers and nonitemizers and introduce a universal charitable deduction. In the U.S. tax system before TCJA, there was a
charitable deduction available to itemizers, a group that represents
only 25% of U.S. taxpayers.84 Proposals for a universal charitable
deduction are motivated by desires to increase the amount of
charitable donations, to protect the interests of charities, and to
83. See Johnson, supra note 1.
84. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
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protect the incentive to donate to charity from being reduced by
other reforms.85 However, extending the charitable deduction to
nonitemizers may decrease federal revenue by as much as 3.8%.86
As a stand-alone policy, this would not be very efficient. Although
it would increase charitable donations in light of the 1981 Economic
Recovery Tax Act,87 a charitable deduction for nonitemizers would
most likely increase the government’s revenue losses at a greater
rate.88 The cost of the IRS enforcing a regime where all charitable
donations were deductible, along with the costs of letting taxpayers
take the standard deduction and a charitable deduction, would
offset the increases in giving that would supposedly result from a
universal charitable deduction. If a charitable deduction were introduced with other key features, it could actually increase giving and
be a more efficient subsidy. This section explains the history of the
charitable deduction to demonstrate its purpose, outlines how a
universal charitable deduction would work, and presents potential
problems and ways to overcome them, including other key features
that would create an economically efficient subsidy. Understanding the history of the charitable deduction is the first step in analyzing the impact of a universal charitable deduction.
1. Brief overview of the charitable deduction
After the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress
enacted an income tax in the Revenue Act of 1913.89 Policymakers
did not enact a charitable deduction until four years later when the
War Revenue Act of 1917 was passed in response to concerns that
charitable giving would drop due to a new, higher tax rate.90 The
charitable deduction provided what is economically the same as a
matching government grant equal to the contribution amount
multiplied by the donor’s marginal income tax rate.91 For example,
for a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 30%, the government

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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Id.
Johnson, supra note 1.
See discussion supra Part III.
See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18.
Id. at 2.
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Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 404.
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essentially pays for 30% of each dollar that the taxpayer donates to
charity, decreasing the after-tax cost of the donation to the taxpayer
by the same amount.92 One motive behind the charitable deduction
was to provide an incentive for taxpayers to donate to charitable
organizations. This incentive was a necessary one because the
charitable sector could sometimes more efficiently solve problems
than the government or an individual acting alone.93
Another motive behind the introduction of the charitable deduction was to more appropriately define the tax base. By measuring
“taxable income as income less charitable giving,” the government
could more accurately measure the income tax base for purposes of
taxation.94 This justification is an illustration of the ability-to-pay
principle and a recognition that income spent on consumption
should be taxed differently than income spent on charitable donations, because these expenditures are so different in result.95 For
example, under this theory a taxpayer who had a gross income of
$50,000 but gave $10,000 to charity should pay the same amount of
tax as a taxpayer who is in all other ways similar but had a gross
income of $40,000 and did not donate anything to charity. They
both have the ability to split $40,000 between consumption and
saving, because the money donated to charity cannot increase their
personal wealth either now or in the future. The ability-to-pay
theory is also not a universally accepted theory. For example, the
Joint Committee on Taxation classifies the charitable contribution
as a tax expenditure in its annual list of tax expenditures.96 The
charitable contribution deduction would not be a tax expenditure if
it were considered a necessary element in measuring ability to pay.
Some other important nuances to the charitable deduction were
introduced later. Now, there are multiple rules about how much of
a charitable deduction can be taken, depending on the type of gift
and the type of organization that receives it.97 Contributions to
charity under TCJA cannot exceed 60% of a taxpayer’s adjusted
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 2.
Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 405.
See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016–2020, at 37 (Jan. 30, 2017).
97. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 403.
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gross income,98 but depending on the character of the donation this
limit can be as low as 20%.99 Charitable deductions are also limited
to donations given during the previous calendar year, but not
limited until taxes are due on April 15 of the current year.100 When
considering the complexity now associated with determining one’s
eligibility for the charitable deduction, it is understandable that one
of the motivations behind TCJA was to create a more simplified
system to make taxes easier for unsophisticated parties. Unfortunately, TCJA did this at the expense of charities. The charitable
deduction has been included as a vital part of the U.S. tax law for
more than a century, and a universal charitable deduction could
help charities by making the charitable deduction accessible to
more taxpayers.
2. Benefits of a universal charitable deduction
A universal charitable deduction is more important now than
ever because charities face the prospect of fewer itemizers in 2018
than in any previous year. In 2017, itemizers gave approximately
$239 billion to charities, while nonitemizers gave around
$53 billion.101 In other words, itemizers gave 82% of all the money
contributed to charities in 2017. This is due in part to the fact that
itemizers are usually wealthier and have more money to donate in
the first place. However, wealthier nonitemizers who itemized
before TCJA have more access to tax-planning services and,
therefore, will likely take advantage of the standard deduction
more this year than in past years. Members of this group may curb
their charitable giving, donating less to charity if they do not
itemize. A universal charitable deduction would prompt higherincome, nonitemizing families, who would take the standard
deduction under TCJA, to donate to charity.102
The following table shows estimates of how much charitable
giving would increase if a charitable deduction were extended to
all taxpayers.103 The total contributions column represents the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 408.
Id. at 403.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
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amount, in billions, that each income quintile contributed to charity
in 2017. The next three columns measure the amount that an income
quintile would increase charitable donations in response to a charitable deduction being available to everyone. The first column, with
an elasticity of 0.5, measures a modest response to the universal
charitable deduction. If the response to the deduction were modest
with an elasticity of 0.5, charitable donations would increase by
$5 billion. Most of the extra charitable giving comes from the
middle-, fourth-, and top-income quintiles, while lower-income
families do not donate much more because they have less discretionary income. If the reaction to the universal charitable deduction
were more responsive, as measured in the chart by the column
where elasticity is 1.0, then there would be an estimated increase in
giving as high as $10 billion. Note that in this example, tax units
with negative adjusted gross income are excluded from the quintile
estimates but are included in the totals in the bottom row, resulting
in lower total increases in giving.104
Table 2

Another benefit of a universal charitable deduction is that it
makes marketing by charities more effective because the charitable
deduction is available to everyone the advertisement reaches.105 A
universal charitable deduction means that donated money from
both itemizers and nonitemizers is subsidized by the government,
so the after-tax cost of giving is the same for both groups.

104. Id.
105. Id.
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An additional benefit of a universal charitable deduction is
evident in light of 1981’s tax legislation that created a second charitable deduction in addition to the charitable deduction available to
itemizers.106 For taxpayers to decide which charitable deduction to
take, they had to calculate what their taxes would be if they
itemized and then calculate their potential tax liability if they took
the standard deduction and the charitable deduction for nonitemizers. This comparison would show which of the two deductions
would be more beneficial. This created additional complexity and
was one reason why this second charitable deduction was abolished by 1987. A single charitable deduction for itemizers and nonitemizers would preserve the incentive to donate to charity for all
taxpayers without increasing the complexity of filing one’s taxes.
3. IRS enforcement and administrative cost problems
The last time that a universal charitable deduction was available to taxpayers, a few problems with the proposal became
apparent. The first problem was that the IRS would have had a
difficult time enforcing a universal charitable deduction. For
taxpayers, a universal charitable deduction would mean that
everyone would have to keep track of how much they were
donating to charity.107 This would make it much more difficult for
the IRS to enforce the tax code. The IRS only audits less than 1% of
individual tax returns because it has limited resources.108 More
charitable deductions could potentially mean more tax fraud.
Leading up to the 1984 tax reform, the IRS argued against this type
of deduction, saying that it created unnecessary complexity, did not
stimulate much additional giving, and would require more
resources than they had available to enforce.109 It referred to these
issues as “a difficult enforcement problem.”110 Historically, the IRS
has not put great effort into investigating whether charitable
deductions were legally taken. The IRS also has almost no way to
verify some casual donations, such as money contributed to
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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collection tins at churches and money donated to people knocking
on doors for donations.111
Nonitemizers in the 1980s who took the charitable deduction
generally reported very small amounts of charitable donations on
their tax returns.112 Without assuming that these donations were
fraudulent, it is at least reasonable to assume that many of these
small amounts would be hard for taxpayers to document if they
were audited. The IRS would not have the resources to audit
returns that reported very small deductions. As such, the charitable
deduction for nonitemizers in the 1980s imposed increased complexity costs on both taxpayers and the IRS, which was ultimately
one of the key reasons it was discontinued.113
Another issue facing a universal charitable deduction is what
has been referred to as the “administrative cost” problem.114 The
administrative cost problem is that a universal charitable deduction
could incentivize some itemizers to reduce their taxes without
increasing their giving.115 In this “double-dipping” scenario, nonitemizers would be able to take both the standard and charitable
deductions, reaping the benefits of the standard deduction while
also receiving the charitable deduction, a provision traditionally
preserved for taxpayers who itemize.116 The following example
provides an explanation of this scenario. Suppose that a household
must choose between a standard deduction of $6000 or an itemized
deduction of $7000, and that $2000 of those itemized deductions are
charitable contributions.117 Under the current tax law, this household would itemize and take deductions worth $7000. However,
under a universal charitable deduction this household would take
the standard deduction of $6000 plus a charitable deduction of
$2000, for total deductions of $8000. This increases deductions for
the household by $1000 over the current law. Tax savings by the

111. Id.
112. JOSEPH CORDES ET AL., URB. INST., EXTENDING THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION TO

NONITEMIZERS: POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS 1 (May 2000), http://webarchive.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/310338_cnp_7.pdf (Charting Civil Society Ser. No. 7).
113. Id. at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Gordon, supra note 62 (citations omitted).
117. CORDES ET AL., supra note 112, at 2.
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taxpayer are revenue costs to the government, and this household
took a higher deduction without increasing the amount of their
charitable giving. Thus, the universal charitable deduction can add
costs to the government from taxpayers who did not give more to
charity, which is a key goal of the universal charitable deduction. A
universal charitable deduction would cost an estimated $13 billion
annually for the federal government, attributable to enforcement
and administrative costs.118 In the model in the previous section,119
even by very optimistic projections, the universal charitable deduction would only generate around $10 billion, which on its own
would make this proposal inefficient.
4. Adding a floor
Despite the problems with IRS enforcement and the administrative costs associated with a universal charitable deduction, a
cleverly designed deduction could address these concerns while
increasing charitable giving with little cost in tax revenue.
Policymakers generally agree that when the cost of giving falls,
people give more.120 However, some studies disagree as to how
much changes in the after-tax cost of charitable donations affect
how much people give to charity. A number of studies find that
giving is modestly responsive to changes in the after-tax cost of
giving, while other studies are more optimistic.121 One study by the
Urban Institute found that it is possible to implement a universal
charitable deduction that addresses concerns with IRS enforcement
and administrative costs even if the responsiveness of charitable
giving to differences in the after-tax cost of giving is low.122 Such a
deduction could reduce pressure on the IRS and decrease the
administrative costs of a universal charitable deduction by introducing a minimum amount of charitable contributions above which
all contributions would be deductible.123 Introducing a floor would
not be an unprecedented move, as a $100 floor for a universal

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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charitable deduction was proposed as a response to ERTA in
1985.124 Other more recent proposals would have allowed nonitemizers to deduct charitable contributions for donations above $1000
for taxpayers filing singly and $2000 for married taxpayers filing
jointly.125 The difficult part of this proposal is to set the floor at an
amount where taxpayers will respond to the incentive. If the floor
were set at an amount above which people usually wouldn’t give
without a deduction, this could be a cost-effective strategy. It would
also limit the number of charitable contributions that the IRS would
have to monitor.126 The floor could be set at either a percentage of
income or a dollar amount, depending on what would be most
efficient. A universal charitable deduction with a floor would also
simplify taxes for taxpayers who contributed small amounts to
charity, conforming to one of the overarching purposes of the
current tax law.127 The results from this study are summarized in
the following table and discussed below.128
Table 3
Summary of Revenue Effects and Change in Charitable Giving (Dollar Amounts in Millions), 1995 Income Levels

The Urban Institute measured the changes in charitable giving
and tax revenue that result from four different ways to extend a

124. Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 5.
125. Duquette, supra note 25, at 196.
126. C. Eugene Steuerle, Charities Have Plenty of Opportunity to Advance Giving Despite

Tax Law Losses, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/charities-have-plenty-opportunity-advance-giving
-despite-tax-law-losses.
127. See CORDES ET AL., supra note 112, at 2.
128. Id. at 3.
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charitable deduction to nonitemizers.129 Under the first scenario,
the charitable deduction would be available to nonitemizers with
the first dollar given.130 The results from this scenario showed that
the concerns with IRS enforcement and administrative cost related
to a charitable deduction for nonitemizers are warranted. Extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers seems to decrease tax
revenue more than it would increase charitable giving, even if the
amount of charitable giving were moderately responsive to fluctuations in the cost of giving.131 However, if taxpayers were very
responsive to decreases in the cost of giving, this scenario could be
efficient, with an estimated increase in total revenue (the change in
giving less revenue effects) at over $1 billion.132
The second scenario would let nonitemizers deduct charitable
contributions, but only at amounts greater than $250 for single filers
and $500 for joint filers.133 The study found that adding a floor had
two effects.134 First, the floor reduced the enforcement cost for the
IRS attributable to taxpayers claiming small deductions that are
hard to document because the $250 or $500 floor mostly excluded
these types of donations.135 This reduction in administrative costs
attributable to the floor still resulted in a total revenue loss, but less
of a loss than would occur under the first scenario.136 Second,
adding the floor may have decreased the costs associated with
extending the charitable deduction to itemizers, but it does little to
increase charitable giving.137 This represents nonitemizers who
were already giving to charity without a tax incentive to do so.138 In
this scenario, the floor does not provide much of a subsidy to giving
that would happen in the absence of an incentive.139
The third scenario represents the result of a universal charitable
deduction with the floor from the second scenario of $500 or $250
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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depending on the taxpayer’s filing status.140 The only difference
between this scenario and the second scenario is that the floor is
extended to all taxpayers and not just nonitemizers.141 With a 28%
tax rate as an example, this floor would cost an itemizer filing a joint
return about $150.142 In this scenario, even if the responsiveness to
changes in the cost of giving is minimal, the extra giving exceeds
the revenue cost.143
The fourth and last scenario in the Urban Institute study set
floors at a calculated level that would result in no overall loss in tax
revenue.144 The results from this study clarify that as long as the
floor is set at the right level, there is a way to create a charitable
deduction for nonitemizers that increases charitable giving and is
also revenue neutral.145 The universal deduction with a universal
floor opens up the opportunity to shift a tax subsidy to the margins
where giving is actually sensitive to price even with a modest
response.146 This allows taxpayers to receive a subsidy because they
are actually giving at levels at which they would not give in the
absence of a floor. This scenario would eliminate the need for any
taxpayers to keep track of their small contributions and not require
the IRS to enforce a tax regime without the necessary resources to
do so.147 Implementing a floor at the right amount would encourage
additional giving and reduce administrative costs to the point
where a universal charitable deduction makes fiscal sense.
Another possible solution to the previously discussed IRS
enforcement and administrative costs is to improve informationreporting systems from charitable organizations. If charities provided electronic or written forms to the IRS and to people from
whom they received donations, they could significantly help the
IRS in its efforts to enforce the tax law.148 This proposal would cost
the IRS virtually no money and, since many charities must already

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 6–7.
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provide taxpayers with official tax documents reflecting any
donations over $250,149 it would not cost charities much either. This
would also help reduce noncompliance with the tax law and help
the government regain revenue associated with people who misrepresent how much they actually donate to charity.150
B. Extend Deducting Power Through April 15
Allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable donations through
April 15 instead of December 31 for a given tax year would provide
an incentive for taxpayers to donate to charity and cut their tax bill
just before their taxes are due.151 This would be similar to how
contributions to individual retirement accounts function, providing
the same incentive and hopefully resulting in more money for
charitable organizations to work with.152
There is precedent for extending the charitable deduction
deadline. Both President Barack Obama and President George W.
Bush have signed provisions that for a limited time allowed
charitable donations toward natural disaster relief to be deducted
as late as March for the previous tax year.153 Making this a
permanent part of the tax code would help solve the advertising
problems of a temporary measure that allows donations made past
the traditional deadline to be deductible.154 Evidence suggests that
people make decisions about charitable giving at the last minute.
One survey in particular shows that 22% of online charitable
donations are made during the last two days of December.155
Additionally, if tax software companies and tax preparers could
compute taxpayers’ tax liability and then show them how extra
donations to charity could reduce their taxable income, it would
create a powerful incentive for taxpayers to give to charity.156
Advertising charitable giving before tax time would create the best
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Steuerle, supra note 126.
Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 429.
C. Eugene Steuerle, Extending the Charitable Deduction Deadline to Tax Day, URBANBROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., (Mar. 2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/pub
lication/23416/412769-Extending-the-Charitable-Deduction-Deadline-to-Tax-Day.PDF
(Tax Policy and Charities Project Brief No. 3).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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window of opportunity for taxpayers to give and allow taxpayers
more certainty in how their donations will help them cut their
tax bill.
C. Eliminate the Phaseout for Charitable Deductions
The Pease provision is a section in the Internal Revenue Code
that limits the amount of itemized deductions by 3 cents per dollar
above a certain adjusted gross income threshold ($313,800 for
married couples filing jointly and $261,500 for single returns in
2017).157 This phaseout is capped at 80% of the value of all itemized
deductions.158 Although TCJA suspended the Pease provision
through the end of 2025, it is important to consider the implications
Pease has on a universal charitable deduction.159 By adding this
provision to the Code, Congress has found a way to cut revenue
losses resulting from itemized deductions taken by high-income
taxpayers. The rationale for this cut is that top earners in America
don’t need deductions for home mortgage interest, since these
subsidies were designed to help poorer Americans pay less tax.
Although the Pease provision has little to no effect on giving
since few taxpayers are subject to the 80% cap, it poses a problem
for a universal charitable deduction. A universal charitable deduction would remove charitable contributions from the itemized
deductions that are subject to the Pease provision.160 In some
models, eliminating the Pease provision altogether would not have
any significant effect on the amount of charitable giving and would
mostly benefit high-income taxpayers.161 If Pease were applied to
both itemized deductions and a universal charitable deduction, it
would create complex problems similar to those associated with the
1981 charitable deduction for nonitemizers.162 So, although not
necessary, eliminating the phaseout for itemized deductions could
actually increase charitable giving because the after-tax cost of

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Erb, supra note 44.
26 U.S.C. § 68(a)(2) (2018).
H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 7.
Id.
Id.
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donating to a charity remains the same and does not decrease with
each additional dollar donated.163
VI. WHAT CHARITIES CAN DO IN RESPONSE TO TCJA
As charities prepare for the worst in the aftermath of TCJA, they
have not yet made a unified effort to speak out against the new tax
law.164 Charities typically are reluctant to get involved in partisan
debates, perhaps due to fear of losing vital federal grants.165 The
nonprofit industry is also very diverse and not particularly
coordinated.166 However, TCJA did create an opportunity for
charities to come together and help redesign tax subsidies and
secure the money they need to do their job.167 Nonprofit organizations have been known to present Congress with wish lists, but
now is an important time for them to present Congress with
alternative provisions that could encourage giving without adding
too much to the budget deficit.168 They need to overcome the
stereotype that charities are just special interest groups and
convince lawmakers from both parties of their vital role in
supporting the public sector. However, charities face a difficult task
in doing so, as lawmakers are sometimes skeptical of charities
because of popular stories about people taking advantage of
charitable donations.169 Others may have become cynical about
how committed highly compensated nonprofit executives are to
their cause compared to contributors.
To illustrate, in the last year a couple of high-profile charities
made headlines due to fraudulent activities by their owners. One
prominent charity, Kids Wish Network, raised millions of dollars
in the name of dying children and their families. However, it spent
less than 3 cents per dollar helping these children.170 Most of this

163. James P. Angelini & Nancy Chun Feng, The Effect of Deduction Phaseout on Charitable
Giving, TAX NOTES 631, 636 (Jan. 29, 2018).
164. Johnson, supra note 1.
165. E.g., id.
166. Id.
167. See Steuerle, supra note 126.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggart, America’s 50 Worst Charities Rake in Nearly
$1 Billion for Corporate Fundraisers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017, 4:10 PM), http://www.
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money ended up with the operators of the charity and the
companies the charity hired to solicit donations.171 Kids Wish
Network used the fact that its name sounds a lot like a reputable
charity, the Make-A-Wish Foundation, to solicit millions of dollars
in donations. In the last ten years, the founder of Kids Wish
Network received $4.8 million, and in the same period the charity’s
corporate solicitors received almost $110 million.172 Another recent
case of charity fraud made headlines when four cancer charities
took from consumers over $187 million that was not donated to
cancer patients.173 Donors were told that their money would help
patients, including women and children suffering from cancer. In
reality, most of the money ended up with the employees of the
small charities, along with their families and friends.174 Because
these sham charities were fundraising for personal gain at the
expense of women and children battling cancer, the Federal Trade
Commission, all fifty states, and the District of Columbia filed
a joint enforcement action condemning deceptive solicitations
by charities.175
Abuses of charitable donations by charity operators are not
limited to these few egregious cases. Charity fraud is a widespread
problem in the United States. The Tampa Bay Times composed a list
of the fifty worst charities in the United States in 2017.176 On
average, the fifty worst charities in the United States give less than
4% of donations received to their stated cause.177 This research
compiled by the Tampa Bay Times has brought under scrutiny 6000
charities that pay for-profit companies to solicit donations for them.
The list of sins committed by charity operators is staggering and
includes being blatantly dishonest about where charitable

tampabay.com/news/nation/americas-50-worst-charities-rake-in-nearly-1-billion-for-cor
porate/2339540.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four
Cancer Charities with Bilking over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-four-cancer
-charities-bilking-over.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Hundley & Taggart, supra note 170.
177. Id.
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donations go, taking multiple salaries, secretly paying themselves
consulting fees, and using accounting tricks to inflate the value of
donated items.178
TCJA reveals that fraudulent activity in the charitable sector is
a legitimate concern for some lawmakers; the bill provides “a new
excise tax on nonprofits that pay their executives $1 million or
more.”179 By being more transparent to the federal government and
clearly demonstrating what they use their funding for, charities
could help build the reputation of the charitable sector in the wake
of well-publicized fraudulent activity. Charities need to clearly
demonstrate the value the nonprofit sector adds to the country in
order to overcome these stereotypes. As charities face budget cuts
and struggle to provide services efficiently, now is an ideal time to
push the government to commit to the charitable sector. It is also
an ideal time for the U.S. government to provide tax benefits for
charities and show that it values groups that help others, reinforcing America’s reputation as a country that uses the charitable
sector to efficiently solve problems.180
VII. CONCLUSION
TCJA was an effort to reduce the complexity of the tax law and
cut taxes for corporations and individuals. One must remember
that TCJA may be similar to ERTA in that some of the changes may
only be temporary, but charities and individuals must nevertheless
cope with these changes and attempt to influence future change.
How the new law will affect taxpayers will be different for each
case, as each taxpayer has his or her own unique financial situation.
However, charities will likely face financial loss due to the
uncertainty produced by TCJA. Tax incentives for donating to
charity have been substantially reduced by the new bill, and the
charitable deduction will be available to fewer taxpayers than ever.
The history of tax reform in the United States shows that charitable
giving is motivated in part by tax incentives. The new bill decreases
potential revenue for charities by doubling the standard deduction,

178. Id.
179. Steuerle, supra note 126.
180. See id.
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increasing the estate tax exemption, and capping the state and local
tax deduction at $10,000.
A universal charitable donation floor would preserve the tax
incentive to donate to charity and also not put any extra strain on
the IRS. Extending deducting power through April 15 and eliminating the phaseout for charitable deductions are two other ways
that the government could recommit to a strong and efficient
charitable sector. If charities can come together and push for these
changes, they could secure their own future and continue to play
their important role in supporting the marginalized in the United
States. This is a worthy goal, and one can only hope that the federal
government will quickly make necessary changes to bolster the
charitable sector and remove some of the potentially adverse effects
of TCJA.
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